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1  Introduction 
 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
1 defines the custom of lobolo as: 
 
Property in cash or in kind, whether known as lobolo, bogadi, bohali, xuma, lumalo, 
thaka, magadi, amabheka or by any other name, which a prospective husband or 
the head of his family undertakes to give to the head of the prospective wife’s 
family in consideration of a customary marriage.
2 
 
Various communities in South Africa practise the custom of lobolo, which people give 
different  names,  is  shown  above.  These  communities  may  be  divided  into  two 
groups, those practicing theleka and those that do not. This article will focus on 
those communities that practise theleka.
3 In the communities practising theleka the 
amount of lobolo is not fixed and the father or guardian of the wife may from time 
to time theleka the wife (her married daughter) and demand one to three head of 
cattle from his son-in-law.
4 The wife and her children, if there are any, may be held 
by their maternal grandfather until the payment of lobolo has been met.
5  
 
                                                           
*   Nqobizwe Mvelo Ngema. LLB (UNIZUL), LLM (UNISA), Certificate in Post Graduate Supervision 
(Rhodes).  Lecturer,  Department  of  Public  Law  (University  of  Zululand).  Email: 
nmngema@pan.uzulu.ac.za. I am highly indebted to my colleague, WJ Ndaba, for reading this 
paper.  However,  the  mistakes,  interpretations  and  conclusions  expressed  in  this  paper  are 
entirely mine. 
1   Section 1(4) Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
2   Section 1(4) Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
3   The custom of  theleka takes place when a wife visits her home and after the expiry of the 
normal visiting time she continues to stay at her home and does not return to her husband’s 
home. Her husband then sends messengers to fetch her and they are informed of why she is 
being held. Theleka is the withholding of a wife by her father or guardian from her husband to 
coerce him to pay the outstanding lobolo. Theleka can also be practised when the husband has 
ill-treated his wife, especially by seriously assaulting her. The father of the wife may demand a 
beast that serves as damages if the husband has ill-treated his wife. The beast paid may be in 
excess of the lobolo originally specified. See Koyana Customary 12-16. 
4   Rautenbach, Bekker and Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism 57. 
5   Rautenbach, Bekker and Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism 57. NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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The practice of theleka has an effect on the custody of the child and the relationship 
of spouses in a customary marriage. The writer draws this conclusion because the 
wife and her children are held by her guardian or father until the completion of the 
payment of lobolo. The custom of theleka, which serves as a way of enforcing lobolo 
amongst Xhosa communities, seems to be in conflict with the best interest of the 
child as entrenched in the Constitution.
6 This is because the court has to consider 
various factors before granting  an application
7 and it  would be unjust if the best 
interest of the child  were to be determined by the payment or non-payment of a 
certain number of cattle. The South African Law Commission
8 recommended that  
 
Lobolo should not be deemed essential for the validity of customary marriages. If 
parties wish to give lobolo, they should be free to do so, but payment or non-
payment will have no effect on the spouses’ relationship or on their rights to any 
children born of the marriage.
9 
 
If this recommendation were to be taken seriously, then the continuation of theleka 
custom may be considered unconstitutional. Unfortunately there is no judgment in 
South Africa since 1994 that has ruled on this issue. This first section of this article 
will discuss the enforcement of lobolo. The second section, dealing with custody in 
customary marriages, will also draw certain inferences. The third section will analyse 
the notion of the best interests of the child again draw certain inferences. The fourth 
section analyses and answers two questions, namely: does the custom of theleka 
constitute abduction? Does the custom of theleka constitute family violence? And it 
makes recommendations based on the discussion and analysis about what should be 
done about theleka custom.  
The following section discusses the enforcement of lobolo in customary law.  
 
2  The enforcement of lobolo in customary law 
 
The manner of enforcing lobolo agreements in customary law varies among different 
cultural groups or tribes in South Africa. Some communities have a fixed amount of 
                                                           
6   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter "the Constitution"). 
7   McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C). 
8   SALRC Harmonisation of the Common Law ch 4. 
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lobolo. The lobolo can be fixed either by agreement between the parties or by the 
accepted  custom in that tribe. In  tribes that have a fixed amount of  lobolo,  the 
delivery of lobolo has to take place before the celebration of the marriage.
10  
 
It is also worth noting that some communities have no fixed amount of lobolo cattle 
to be delivered, the marriage depending on the delivery of a reasonable number of 
cattle.
11 The court has discretion to decide what constitutes a reasonable number of 
lobolo cattle or amount of money, having regard to what average lobolo has been 
established in the community concerned, and bearing in mind the social standing of 
the woman.
12 Among various Xhosa communities, the amount of  lobolo payable is 
not limited  to a specific amount  and constitutes a bond of goodwill between the 
families of the bride and the bridegroom for  the entire life of the bride and even 
after her death. The prospective bridegroom would be expected to give up one, two 
or  three  head  of  cattle  each  time  his  father -in-law  turned  to  him  for  help.
13 
Therefore, it is inconceivable that the bridegroom would refuse to give him the cattle 
if he was in a position to help. Moreover, there is the influence of tradition as well as 
the religious sanction.
14  There  is  a belief among traditionalists   as well as  non-
traditionalists  that  a  woman  for  whom   lobolo  was  not  delivered  will  not  have 
children.
15  This does not mean that  lobolo  buys the reproductive capacity of a 
woman, but that the ancestors will not allow her to procreate.
16 The South African 
Law Commission
17 has noted that the payment of lobolo 
 
is  the  framework  that  people  use  to  express  and  to  bring  about  complicated 
changes in terms of relationships and deep changes in terms of emotional realities, 
values,  attitudes  and  concepts.  It  is  also  the  language  that  the  ancestors 
understand and bless. 
 
                                                           
10   Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322.  
11   Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322. 
12   Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 163. 
13   Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322.  
14   Malinowski Crime and Custom 52. 
15   Malinowski Crime and Custom 52. 
16   Dlamini Juridical Analysis 322. 
17   SALRC Harmonisation of the Common Law ch 4. NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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This shows that people who adhere to the custom of lobolo view it as a significant 
custom  that  connects  them  with  their  ancestral  spirits.  Failure  to  pay  it  might 
therefore bring bad luck and the bridegroom may encounter difficulties if he resists 
the payment of lobolo. These views on lobolo are affirmed by the observation that 
lobolo is widely practised by most black South Africans, who are not prepared to 
abandon it despite the difficulties it gives rise to. 
 
If  the  wife’s  father  or  guardian  demands  a  reasonable  amount  of  lobolo,  the 
bridegroom has an obligation to comply with those demands.
18 The failure to comply 
therewith entitles the father or guardian of the wife to theleka her until the demand 
has been met. This means that the wife, together with her children, can be taken 
back to the wife’s family group and held under theleka until her husband complies 
with the demand for the payment of lobolo.
19 The wife’s father or guardian usually 
resorts to theleka rather than a court action for the enforcement of lobolo, and if the 
wife’s father were to institute a court action without resorting to theleka, his son-in-
law could raise the omission to theleka as a defense.
20 
 
South African courts have already ruled that the wife’s father or guardian should not 
be entitled to resort to customary law methods for the enforcement of  lobolo in 
relation to civil or Christian marriages.
21 This shows that the guardianship of children 
born of a civil marriage is governed by common law.
22 It is relevant to consider the 
civil law position in regard to t his issue. This  point  is made here  because the 
payment of lobolo is not essential to the validity of a civil or Christian marriage. In 
the  case  of  Cheche  v  Nondabula
23  the  parties  were  Hlubis.  The  father  of  the 
                                                           
18   Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 163; Olivier et al Indigenous Law 28; Soga The ama-Xosa 263 
et seq; Skweyiya v Sixakwe 1941 NAC (C& O) 126; Ngxabalaza v Njovane 1939 NAC (C&O) 96. 
19   Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law 164; see also the following cases cited by Bekker, namely: 
Mkhohlwa v Mangaliso 1 NAC 202; Tiyeka v Feja 4 NAC 343; Baleni v Sidlo 4 NAC 344; Ntlekwini 
v Maqokolo 4 NAC 345. 
20   Mkohlwa v Mangaliso 1 NAC 202 (1908); Menzi v Matiwane 1964 NAC 58 (S); Monghayelana v 
Msongelwa 3 NAC 292 (1913); Skweyiya v Sixakwe 1941 NAC (C&O) 126. 
21   Cheche v Nondabula 1962 NAC 23 (S) 28; Menzi v Matiwane 1964 NAC 58 (S); Monghayelana v 
Msongelwa 3 NAC 292 (1913); Skweyiya v Sixakwe 1941 NAC (C&O) 126; Peart Consideration of 
Certain Aspects of Customary Law 56. 
22   Mbuli v Mehlomakhulu 1961 BAC (S) 66; Msomi v Msomi 1968 BAC (N-E) 29; Mvunyiswa v Mayile 
1964 BAC (S) 25. 
23   Cheche v Nondabula 1962 NAC 23 (S). NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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bridegroom (the defendant) was involved in the negotiations that preceded his son’s 
marriage. The defendant paid to the plaintiff eight head of cattle and the equivalent 
of three others in cash as lobolo. The plaintiff sued, among other things, for the 
payment of fourteen head of cattle and one horse as the balance of lobolo. It was a 
custom amongst the Hlubis to have a fixed amount of lobolo of twenty-five head of 
cattle and one horse. The defendant pleaded that he had agreed to pay only twelve 
head of cattle, but the court rejected his evidence and treated the case as one in 
which there was a marriage without an express lobolo agreement. The court held 
that  the  payment  of  lobolo  is  not  essential  to  the  validity  of  a  civil  or  Christian 
marriage. When it is paid in a civil marriage the lobolo contract is ancillary to the 
marriage  contract  and  must  be  subject  to  a  special  agreement  and  cannot  be 
implied. The court held further that the custom of  theleka is not consistent with 
Roman-Dutch law of marriages. 
 
In a similar case of Gomani v Baqwa
24 the plaintiff sued for the return of lobolo paid 
by him to the defendant whose daughter he married according to civil rites . In this 
case it was alleged that the woman  had  committed adultery and deserted the 
plaintiff and thereafter cohabited with  Luswazi. This marriage was dissolved by the 
court of the chief magistrate on the ground that the wife committed adultery. The 
magistrate held that the dissolution of a Christian marriage has nothing to do with 
the question of the return of lobolo.  
 
The following section deals with custody in customary law and how it is regulated.  
 
3  Custody in customary law 
 
Custody is defined by Bekker as: 
 
the capacity of a person to have actual physical "possession" of the minor, to live 
with him or her, to take care of him or her and to assist him or her in his or her 
daily life.
25 
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In communities practicing theleka the wife and her children are held by the guardian 
or father of the wife until the payment of lobolo is made. This practice has an impact 
on the custody of the children because the father of the wife gains the possession of 
her daughter together with her children and lives with them until the payment of 
further  lobolo  has  been  made.  To  put  it  differently,  the  parents-in-law  of  the 
husband take custody of his children.  
 
In customary law, the parental rights are determined by the payment of lobolo.
26 If 
the husband has complied with his duty to pay lobolo, he and his family group have 
full parental rights to the   children  had  by  the wife during the existence of the  
marriage. Customary law places more emphasis on deciding to which family a child 
is linked. This is aptly summed up in Madyibi v Nguva
27 as follows: 
 
By nature the progeny of a woman accrue to her father’s group and are members 
of his group and tribe for religious and political purposes … these rights and duties 
are  transferred  by  Native  law  to  another  group  only  on  contraction  of  a  valid 
customary union whereby the woman’s group receives lobolo from the other group 
and transfers the natural right to the woman’s productive powers and her progeny 
to the group providing lobolo. 
 
However, our courts are in favour of giving effect to the principle of the best interest 
of the child whenever the custody of the child is under dispute.
28  
 
In  the case of  Hlophe v Mahlalela,
29  the court  applied the principle of the best 
interest of the child when the father of a minor child was seeking custody of his child 
based on  the fact that he had partially paid   lobolo.  The court  was afforded the 
opportunity to consider the award to a father of  the custody of his minor children 
after the death of his wife. The spouses had been married under Swazi customary 
law and the payment of lobolo had not yet been settled at the time of death of the 
                                                           
26   Bennett Customary Law 285. 
27   Madyibi v Nguva 4 NAC 40 as quoted by Bekker 2008 Obiter 403.  
28   Mkhize 1951 NAC 336 (NE). There is a great deal of literature on the best interests  of the child, 
but it has not been argued that the principle of the best interest ought to be extended even 
during the application of  theleka custom. See Bennett 1999 Obiter 145; Knoetze 1999  Obiter 
207-214; Labuschagne 2000 CILSA 333-336; Maithufi "Best Interests of the Child" 137-149. 
29   Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD). NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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wife.  Van  den  Heever  AJ  held  that  notwithstanding  any  general  customary  law 
position  regarding  the  custody  of  children,  the  basic  principles  of  customary  law 
regulating child custody had been excluded in favour of the common law.
30 This 
meant that the principle of best interest of the child took precedence over the basic 
principles regulating custody in customary law.
31 This case shows that issues relating 
to the custody of a minor cannot be determined by the mere delivery or non-delivery 
of lobolo.  
 
The custom of theleka has an impact on the custody of children held in terms of that 
custom because the children so held might be prevented from attending a school 
they are used to , or  even the quality of  the  education they receive  might  be 
affected. In the light of the constitutional protection of the right to education, it  
becomes obvious that  theleka carries grave implications. The right to education is 
protected in the  Constitution
32  and is a universally  recognised right.  The  United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights  proclaims that "education shall be directed to 
the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms ".
33 Parents are vested with the prior 
right to choose the kind of education to be given to their children.
34  A  similar 
provision is contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. This Covenant recognises the right to education and provides that education 
should be purposive and "directed to the full development of the human personality 
and the sense of dignity".
35 It is submitted here that the right of the child to human 
dignity  and  other  rights  enshrined  in  the  latter  international  human  rights 
instruments would be violated if he  or she  were to be prevented from attending 
school just because of the incomplete payment of lobolo for the mother.  
 
The following section analyses the concept of the best interests of the child. 
 
                                                           
30   Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD) 458F-G. 
31   Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (TPD) 458G-459C.  
32   Section 29 of the Constitution. 
33   Article 26 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
34   Article 26(3) United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
35   Article 13(1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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4  The best interests and wishes of the child 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child
36 stipulates that the best interests of the 
child shall be a primary consideration in all actions concerning the child. South Africa 
is compelled to implement the  principle of safeguarding  best interests of the child 
because it is a signatory to the convention. South Africa has gone a further step in 
promoting the best interest of the child by incorporating the principle in section 28 of 
the  Constitution,  which  provides that  "a  child’s  best  interests  are  of  paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child". It has been noted that it is not an 
easy exercise to determine the best interest of the child. Further, the question is 
exacerbated by the fact that the issue has not been given exhaustive treatment in 
South  African,  foreign  or  international  jurisprudence.
37  Furthermore,  the wording 
does not prescribe the range of factors that must be considered in determining what 
constitutes the child’s best interests.
38 The imprecision that surrounds the concept 
has led one of the commentators to declare that it is indeterminate and working with 
it  is  similar  to  exercising  "Solomonic  judgment."
39  The other difficulty about the 
principle is that "what is best for a specific child or children cannot be determined 
with  absolute  certainty ".
40  This  is  aptly  summed  up  in  the  Constitutional  court 
judgment in S v M.
41 There Sachs J acknowledged the indeterminacy of the notion of 
"the best interest of the child " and stated that it provides little guidance to thos e 
given the task of applying it. The learned Justice held that: 
 
… it is necessary that the standard should be flexible as individual circumstances 
will  determine  which  factors  secure  the  best  interests  of  a  particular  child. 
Furthermore, the list of factors competing for the core of best interests is almost 
endless and will depend on a particular factual situation.
42 
 
Bennett observed that "according to the conventional wisdom in the 1930s, 1940s 
and 1950s, customary law had no particular concern with the welfare of children. 
                                                           
36   Article 3(1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). 
37   Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC). 
38   Kaime African Charter 110. 
39   Mnookin 1975 LCP 226.  
40   Mahlobogwane 2010 Obiter 233; Heaton 1990 THRHR 96-97. 
41   S v M 2008 1 SA 232 (CC) para 24. 
42   S v M 2008 1 SA 232 (CC) para 24. NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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Instead its emphasis lay on deciding to which family a child should be affiliated".
43 It 
is a pity that even today the best interests of the child and  the wishes of the child 
are not taken into consideration by those communities that practice the custom of 
theleka as a way of enforcing lobolo agreements. 
 
The failure to consider the best interests of the c hild and  the wishes of the child 
conflicts with the  provisions of the  Convention on the Rights of the Child , which 
emphasises the significance of considering the opinion o f a child when determining 
his or her best interests. The Convention stipulates that: 
 
1  States parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own 
views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the 
views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity 
of the child. 
2  For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be 
heard  in  any  judicial  and  administrative  proceedings  affecting  the  child,  either 
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent 
with the procedural rules of national law.
44 
 
Similarly, the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights
45 stipulates 
that a child: 
 
Considered  by  internal  law  as  having  sufficient  understanding  shall  in  judicial 
proceedings  affecting  him  be  granted  and  be  entitled  to  request  the  following 
rights: 
a) To receive all the relevant information; 
b) To be consulted and express his or her own views; 
c)  To be informed of the possible consequences of compliance with these views 
and the possible consequences of any decision. 
 
                                                           
43   Bennett 1999 Obiter 146. 
44   Articles  12(1)  and  (2)  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child   (1989).  The 
provisions of the latter article have been incorporated in s 10 of the  Children’s Act 38 of 2005, 
which provides that: "every child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to 
be  able  to  participate  in  any  matter  concerning  that  child  has  a  right  to  participate  in  an 
appropriate way and views expressed by the child must be given due consideration". In a similar 
vein, section 31 deals with major decisions involving the child and stipulates that: (i)(a) Before a 
person  holding  parental  responsibilities  and  rights  in  respect  of  a  child  takes  any  decision 
contemplated in paragraph (b), that person must give due consideration to any views and wishes 
expressed by the child, bearing in mind the child’s age, maturity and stage of development.  
45   Article 3  European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights (1996) (South Africa is a 
signatory of the Convention). NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
46 also protects the best 
interests of the child
47  in similar terms to those provided by the  United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. It provides that the views of the child have to 
be taken into consideration in matters affecting the child as follows: 
 
In  all  judicial  or  administrative  proceedings  affecting  a  child  who  is  capable  of 
communicating his or her own views, [an] opportunity shall be provided for the 
views of the child to be heard either directly or through an impartial representative 
as a party to the proceedings, and those views shall be taken into consideration by 
the relevant authority in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law.
48 
 
The provisions of the latter international and regional human rights instruments lead 
to an inference that the custom of theleka conflicts with them. The consideration of 
the child’s opinion in matters affecting him or her is of crucial importance because it 
enables the court to be acquainted with the child’s needs, problems and aspirations, 
the kind of relationship he has with each parent, and the child’s personality.
49 In 
order for the opinion of a child to be considered, his or her age
50 and maturity
51 
have to be considered too.  
 
The following section discuss es  whether  theleka  custom constitutes abduction or 
not.  
 
                                                           
46   Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 11 July 1990 and entered into force on 29 November 1999. 
47   Article 4(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). 
48   Article 4(2) 4(1) African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990); see also a 19(1) 
which provides that "… no child shall be separated from his parents against his will, except when 
a judicial authority determines in accordance with the appropriate law, that such separation is in 
the best interest of the child". 
49   Grossman and Scherman 2005 Fam L Q 557. 
50   Greenshields v Wyllie  1989  4 SA 898 (W);  Oppel v Oppel  1973 3 SA 675 (T);  Mathews v 
Mathews 1983 4 SA 136 (SE). In these cases the courts were inclined to consider the age of the 
child rather than the maturity. 
51   McCall v McCall 1994 3 SA 201 (C);  Martens v Martens 1991 4 SA 287 (TPD);  Meyer v Gerber 
1999 3 SA 550 (O). In these cases the courts decided to consider the maturity of the child rather 
than the age. NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
415 / 536 
 
5  Does theleka constitute abduction? 
 
Snyman defines abduction as: 
 
[a] person, either male or female, commits abduction if he or she unlawfully and 
intentionally  removes  an  unmarried  minor,  who  may  likewise  be  either  male  or 
female, from the control of his or her parents or guardian and without the consent 
of such parents or guardian, intending that he or she or somebody else may marry 
or have sexual intercourse with the minor.
52 
 
The theleka custom does not constitute abduction, because the action of the father 
or guardian of the wife to resort to theleka custom as a way of enforcing lobolo is 
not unlawful and it is permitted in those communities practising it. The intention of a 
person practicing theleka custom is to enforce lobolo agreement and not to marry or 
have  sexual  intercourse  with  the  minor.  Therefore,  the  argument  that  theleka 
custom constitutes abduction is not persuasive. It is submitted here that  theleka 
custom does not constitute abduction. 
 
The following section will discuss whether the custom of theleka constitutes family 
violence or not. 
 
6  Does theleka constitute family violence? 
 
The following  acts  are recognised as domestic violence in the  Domestic Violence 
Act:
53  physical abuse; sexual abuse; emotional, verbal and psychological abuse; 
economic abuse; intimidation; harassment; stalking; damage to property; entry into 
complainant’s residence without consent, where the parties do not share the same 
residence; any other controlling or abusive behaviour towards a complainant, where 
such conduct harms, or may cause imminent harm to, the safety, health or wellbeing 
of the complainant. 
 
                                                           
52   Snyman Criminal Law 403. 
53   Section 1(viii) Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (hereafter "the Domestic Violence Act"). NM NGEMA    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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In the light of this definition the challenge is that some husbands believe that they 
are entitled to chastise or assault their wives physically because they paid lobolo for 
them.
54 Assault is a form of physical abuse that constitutes family violence.
55 The 
belief that it is permissible to assault or chastise women is exacerbated by a change 
in the  practices regarding  the  payment of  lobolo:  nowadays grooms usually pay 
lobolo from their own pockets, rather than having their families pay lobolo for their 
first wives.
56 This tendency has led to the limitation of  the groom’s family’s ability 
and willingness to intervene in the marriage and to end family violence.
57 Currie and 
Bonthuys
58 have aptly argued that the vulnerability of women to family violence has 
increased, as follows: 
 
Because  lobolo  is  paid  to  wives’  fathers  and  is  often  spent  shortly  after  being 
received, wives’ families may be reluctant to allow them to return home when they 
suffer  domestic  violence  because  of  their  inability  to  return  the  lobolo  to  the 
husband. Thus women’s own families may collude with violent husbands to trap 
them in abusive marriages.
59 
 
On the other hand, theleka custom serves as a way of stopping family violence. It is 
practiced when the husband has ill-treated his wife, especially by seriously assaulting 
her. The father or guardian of the wife may request a beast as damages from his 
son-in-law if the latter has assaulted his wife. The beast paid may be in excess of 
the lobolo originally specified. This purpose of theleka custom is good, because it 
reduces  instances  of  family  violence  by  demanding  that  the  wrongdoer  (the 
husband) has to pay damages if he has assaulted his wife.  
 
It is noted that, despite its advantages, the custom has weaknesses. This is because 
the payment of one beast or two as damages for assaulting a wife might not be too 
difficult  a  fine  for  rich  men.  Thus  a  rich  man  could  assault  his  wife  repeatedly 
knowing that he will be able to afford to pay damages. This eventually might expose 
                                                           
54   Bennett Customary Law 251. 
55   See also s 1(xvi) of the Domestic Violence Act. 
56   Bennett Customary Law 228, 230. 
57   Curran and Bonthuys 2005 SAJHR 616-617. 
58   Curran and Bonthuys 2005 SAJHR 616-617. 
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rural  women  to  family  violence  despite  the  practice  of  theleka  custom,  which  is 
otherwise designed to protect them.  
 
The  chastisement  of  a  wife  by  her  husband  is  a  family  matter  that  is  generally 
regarded as a private matter and is not meant for the eyes and ears of outsiders, 
and communities disapprove of women who resort to public forums to deal with 
domestic violence.
60 A wife would therefore approach a traditional court only as a 
last resort.  This is exacerbated by the fact that the  Domestic Violence Act, which 
aims to provide speedy, effectiv e and accessible relief to various  complainants,
61 
seems to be an unfulfilled dream to rural women. This is because it can be enforced 
only  by  Magistrate  Courts  and  Family  Courts
62  and  traditional  courts  have  no 
authority  to  issue  protection  orders.  This  poses  problems  because  there  are 
approximately 1500 traditional courts operating in South Africa .
63 It is argued that 
rural women under the jurisdiction of these traditional authorities might be limited 
by linguistic and economic reasons from accessing Magistrate s’ Courts and Family 
Courts. This weakness is a matter of serious concern "if one considers the fact that 
almost  32  per  cent  of  South  Africa’s  traditional  communities  of  about  35  million 
people live in the rural areas and therefore fall under the authority of traditional 
authorities".
64 As a result, it is submitted that there is a need to extend the authority 
to  impose  protection  orders  to  traditional  courts .  At  the  same  time   it  is  also 
submitted that the custom of theleka does not constitute family violence. 
The following section discusses what should be done about theleka custom in order 
for it to  accord with the  Constitution. As will be seen , it will be argued that the 
theleka custom ought to be developed. 
 
                                                           
60   Lempert 2003 Agenda 89-100. 
61   See the preamble of the Domestic Violence Act.  
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7  Development of theleka custom 
 
It  is  noted  that  the  Constitution
65  protects  the  right  to  culture  in  numerous 
provisions which refer to the cultural diversity of the South African population.  The 
preamble to the Constitution, for instance, clearly refers to the diversity of the South 
African population. The Constitution
66prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds 
inter alia of culture. In addition the Constitution
67 provides for the protection and the 
promotion of the rights of traditional, religious, cultural and linguistic communities. It 
also  provides  for  the  establishment  of  a  Commission  for  the  Prom otion  and 
Protection of the Right s  of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities
68  and 
chapter 12 deals with the recognition and role of traditional leaders.  It is crucial to 
note  that  all  of  the  constitutional  provisions  dealing  with  the  promotion  and 
protection of the right to culture and religion are subject to the values that underlie 
the Constitution. In order for the latter rights to have meaning and true protection 
there is a necessity to start by developing a customary rule  in accordance with the 
Constitution whenever possible, and to use abolition only as a last resort. 
 
Section 39 of the Constitution provides that: 
 
1  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a)  Must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b)  Must consider international law; and 
(c) May consider foreign law 
2  When  interpreting  any  legislation,  and  when  developing  the  common  law  or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
object of the Bill of Rights. 
3  The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other right and freedoms 
that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to 
the extent that they are consistent with the Bill. 
 
                                                           
65   Sections 30, 31, 211 and 212 of the Constitution. 
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The court’s obligation as provided in the above section is emphasized in the case of 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security,
69 where the Constitutional Court held 
that: 
The obligation of courts to develop common law in the context of the section 3 9 
objectives is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, it is implicit in section 39(2) 
read with section 173 that where the common law as it stands is deficient in 
promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a general obligation to 
develop it appropriately. 
 
The Carmichele case applies equally to the development of customary law. When a 
customary law rule deviates from the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights , 
courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove such devi ation.
70  The 
development of customary law is important because  "once a rule is struck down, 
that is the end of that particular rule, yet there may be many people who observe 
the rule".
71 Theleka custom is still practised in some communities
72 and it serves a 
twofold purpose, namely the enforcement of lobolo and the prevention of violence 
directed against married females.  
 
Despite the good  intentions  underlying  the  theleka  custom, it violates the best 
interests of the child because the voice of the child is no t heard when the child is 
held under theleka, particularly in that it may interfere with the educational rights of 
the child. 
  
8  Conclusion 
 
As has been argued above, the rights of a child are still severely affected and not 
taken into consideration in those communities that practice the custom of theleka. It 
is submitted in this article that the custom of theleka as it is practised at present 
                                                           
69   Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 39. 
70   Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of RSA  
2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 215. 
71   Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of RSA 
2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 215. 
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impacts on the custody of children and clashes with the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
73 the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child,
74 the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s 
Rights
75 and the Constitution of South Africa.
76 This conclusion is made here because 
the  best  interests  of  a  child  and  the  opin ion  of  the  child  are  not  taken  into 
consideration when practicing  theleka custom, while the international instruments 
mentioned above emphasise  that the  views  of a child  have to be cons idered in 
matters affecting him or her .  It is submitted that  theleka  custom needs  to be 
developed to consider the opinion and wishes of the child in order for it to be in line 
with the  Constitution. This article has drawn an inference that   theleka  custom 
neither constitutes abduction nor family violence and  that the practice  should be 
allowed to continue. 
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